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EMERGING BEST PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERIC TRUST
CASE LAW
Rachel M. Pemberton* & Michael C. Blumm**
Abstract
With climate change litigation proliferating throughout the world, a
substantial body of case law is emerging. As part of a project of the IUCN
World Commission on Environmental Law's Climate Change Specialist
Group, this Article, a version of which will be included in a “Judicial
Handbook on Climate Litigation,” explains the public trust doctrine’s
influence on climate change litigation internationally. We select what we
view as judicial “best practices” as a kind of restatement of international
atmospheric trust law in 2022. International atmospheric trust law is at
the forefront of many best practices, as state and federal courts in the
United States have fettered the public trust doctrine’s development by
erecting procedural hurdles like standing and political question doctrines.
On the other hand, international courts do not suffer from these
procedural limitations, allowing them to reach the merits of public trust
claims in the context of climate change. This Article explains these
developments in an effort to synthesize the rapidly developing case law.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change litigation is surging in the face of scientific consensus that
Earth’s warming over the past century will soon dramatically interfere with human
and natural systems.1 Given the complexity of the problem, climate change plaintiffs
often bring creative claims using “unconventional” legal tools outside the realm of
environmental statutes.2 One such tool is the public trust doctrine, an ancient
doctrine rooted in the writings of Justinian that exemplifies the democratic principle
of anti-monopolization over public resources.3 The public trust doctrine recognizes
that sovereigns have an inherent duty as an incident of their sovereignty to act as a
trustee over those resources.4 Although the doctrine was traditionally invoked to
protect navigable waters for public use5—particularly in England and the United
States6—courts across the globe have expanded the doctrine’s scope in numerous
contexts.7 Indeed, this ancient doctrine’s continuing relevance to natural resources
law demonstrates its adaptable nature.8
1

Earth Sci. Commc’ns Team, Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming,
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/
[https://perma.cc/JF4E-NHAT] (last updated June 15, 2022) (stating that at least 97% of
climate scientists agree that climate change is “extremely likely due to human activities”).
2
See Mary Christina Wood & Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation
and the Constitutional Right to a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition at Last, 6
WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 633, 643–45 (2016) (describing the need for a “macro
approach” to climate change litigation and distinguishing such an approach from climate
change litigation relying on statutory or nuisance law).
3
See generally Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen Moses, The Public Trust as an
Antimonopoly Doctrine, 44 B.C. ENV’T. AFFS. L. REV. 1 (2017).
4
See Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A
Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENV’T. L. 287, 311 (2010) (“[P]ublic trust
principles have been described as an essential attribute of sovereignty across cultures and
across millennia.”).
5
See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENV’T. L. 425, 428–30 (1989) (“[A] great
many countries have legal rules that, in one fashion or another, give special treatment to
major bodies of water” with roots including ancient Roman and Chinese law, medieval
Spanish and French law, and Muslim and Native American cultures).
6
See, e.g., Ill. Central. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (upholding a state
legislature’s invalidation of a former legislative grant of submerged lands beneath Chicago
harbor to a private railroad company as inconsistent with the sovereign trust over navigable
waters); but see Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (explaining, in a
suit by one state to enjoin noxious gas discharges from another state, that each “state has an
interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain”).
7
See infra Part I.A.
8
See Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable
Approach to International Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291, 296 (1976)
(“[T]he doctrine has qualities of breadth and flexibility that make it particularly useful to the
solution of complex international environmental problems.”).

2022]

INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERIC TRUST CASE LAW

943

Plaintiffs bringing atmospheric trust9 claims often face issues of justiciability
that do not normally arise when courts apply the public trust doctrine to longrecognized, “traditional” public trust resources—navigable waterways.10
Nonetheless, understanding the impending threats posed by climate change, several
courts have concluded that the atmosphere is within the doctrine’s scope.11
Numerous other courts have at least recognized the public’s strong interest in a
properly functioning climate system.12 This paper identifies and explores two
analytical frameworks evident in international atmospheric trust jurisprudence as
emerging best practices: (1) constitutional recognition and (2) inter-resource
affectation.13 International jurists can and should continue to employ these
frameworks when they evaluate atmospheric trust claims.
This paper maintains that the public trust doctrine protects the atmosphere
whenever constitutional language establishes public rights in or the sovereign’s
responsibility for air and climate, a healthy environment, or natural resources
generally. Many courts have rooted their support for an atmospheric trust in
constitutional language, even absent an explicit reference to air or climate, where
the relevant constitution establishes common rights in a healthy environment or
natural resources.14 Judicial embrace is strongest when the relevant constitutional
provision also speaks to principles of inter-generational equity.15 Thus, courts appear
to be sensitive to the long-term challenges inherent in natural resource management
and recognize that the sovereign is in the best position to ensure the continued
viability of those resources by exercising its trust duties.

9

In this Article, we refer to application of the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere
as an “atmospheric trust.” Cf. Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, “No Ordinary
Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV.
1, 21–30, 67–83 (2017) (detailing atmospheric trust litigation); Mary Christina Wood,
Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 99, 99 (William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
10
See, e.g., Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(dismissing plaintiffs’ atmospheric trust suit for lack of standing and, in the alternative, as
alleging a nonjusticiable political question); La Rose v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2020] 2020
F.C.R. 1008, at ¶ 102 (Can. Ont. Fed. Ct.) (granting government’s motion to dismiss because
“the public trust doctrine, while justiciable, does not disclose a reasonable cause of action”)
(appeal pending, A-289-20 (Can. Fed. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2020)), https://www.canlii.org/en/
ca/fct/doc/2020/2020fc1008/2020fc1008.pdf [https://perma.cc/X67X-4C9Q].
11
See infra Part II.A–C.
12
See infra Part II.C.
13
One expert noted that “an increasing number of domestic courts around the world are
considering the issue of climate change, and citing to . . . the decisions of the courts of other
countries.” Michael B. Gerrard, Taking Climate Change to the International Court of Justice:
Legal and Procedural Issues, COLUM. L. SCH.: CLIMATE L. BLOG (Sept. 29, 2021),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2021/09/29/taking-climate-change-to-theinternational-court-of-justice-legal-and-procedural-issues/ [https://perma.cc/7WAF-HAST].
14
See infra Part II.B–C.
15
See infra Part II.D.
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This paper also contends that the atmosphere is subject to the public trust
doctrine whenever plaintiffs allege, with supporting scientific evidence, that climate
change has impaired their use of traditional public trust resources.16 Although courts
have not always held that the atmosphere itself is a public trust resource, several
courts have concluded that threats to non-traditional public trust resources are
intricately tied to traditional public trust resources.17 In at least one court’s view, the
connection between the atmosphere and navigable waters is sufficient to bring the
atmosphere within the public trust doctrine’s scope as a matter of inter-resource
affectation.18 Likewise, some courts have expanded the public trust doctrine to
include groundwater as a trust resource, relying on the scientific consensus that
ground and surface waters are interconnected to hold that when groundwater use
affects surface waters, the groundwater must be managed consistent with the public
trust.19 This basic reasoning should apply with equal force to the atmosphere—the
degradation of which has scientifically demonstrable effects on navigable surface
waters.20
We present the emerging best practices associated with applying the public trust
doctrine to the atmosphere in the context of climate change litigation, offering two
analytical frameworks: (1) constitutional recognition and (2) inter-resource
affectation. Part I provides background on the historical scope of the public trust
doctrine; explores how courts proceed with interpreting claims under the public trust
doctrine; explains, through examples, how the threats posed by climate change have
given rise to an atmospheric trust; and discusses the doctrine’s embodiment of basic
trust principles. Part II explores the first framework, constitutional recognition,
under which courts analyze atmospheric trust claims. Part III explores the second
framework, inter-resource affectation, under which courts can analyze atmospheric
trust claims. The paper concludes that the public trust doctrine, when analyzed by
courts under either of the above frameworks, gives rise to an atmospheric trust that
the sovereign must manage in the public interest and safeguard against substantial
impairment.21

16

See infra Part I.A (identifying navigable waterways as the traditional public trust
resources).
17
See infra Part III.A–B.
18
See infra Part III.B.
19
See infra Part III.A.
20
See, e.g., Maggie Fox & Vickie Allen, Climate Change Drying Up Big Rivers, Study
Finds, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2009, 10:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climaterivers/climate-change-drying-up-big-rivers-study-finds-idUSTRE53K4MR20090421
[https://perma.cc/D7ZT-WR2V].
21
See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892) (holding that any improvements
to public trust property may “not substantially impair the public interest” because the state
may not relinquish “control of property in which the public has an interest”).
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I. THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
“The public trust [doctrine] is a dual concept of sovereign right and
responsibility.”22 As courts see it, “[p]ublic trust claims are unique because they
concern inherent attributes of sovereignty”23 and do not depend on regulations,
statutes, or even constitutions for their force.24 One court explained that “[i]n its
broadest sense, the term ‘public trust’ refers to the fundamental understanding that
no government can legitimately abdicate its core sovereign powers.”25 Indeed, “[t]he
public trust imposes on the government an obligation to protect the res of the trust,”
and “[a] defining feature of that obligation is that it cannot be legislated away.”26 In
other words, with respect to “essential natural resources,” “the sovereign’s public
trust obligations prevent it from ‘depriving a future legislature of the natural
resources necessary to provide for the well-being and survival of its citizens.’”27
Since it is both a sovereign right and responsibility, the public trust doctrine
empowers the sovereign to hold essential natural resources in trust for the public and
also requires the sovereign to ensure those resources remain available for public use
and enjoyment.
The following sections provide additional context and background on the
public trust doctrine, while subsequent Parts explore the doctrine’s application to the
atmosphere. Section A discusses the historical scope of the public trust doctrine.
Section B explores the trends in judicial interpretation and the potential for judicial
expansion of the doctrine’s scope. Section C explains how the threats posed by
22

In re Water Use Permit Applications for Waiāhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw.
2000) [hereinafter Waiāhole Ditch].
23
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Waiāhole Ditch, 9 P.3d at 443 (stating that “history and
precedent have established the public trust as an inherent attribute of sovereign authority”);
Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 837 (S.D. 2004); Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No.
1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) (explaining that
the public trust doctrine is derived “from the inherent nature of Arizona’s status as a
sovereign state”); Mineral Cnty. v. Lyons Cnty., 473 P.3d 418, 425 (Nev. 2020)
(characterizing the public trust doctrine as being “derive[d] from inherent limitations on a
state’s sovereign powers”).
24
See Oposa v. Factoran, 33 I.L.M. 173, 185 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.) (holding that “the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology” belongs to a unique category of basic rights, “for
it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation . . . the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions”).
25
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1252 (citing Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820
(1879)).
26
Id. at 1260; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 459–60 (1892) (explaining
that “legislative acts concerning public interests are necessarily public laws” and holding that
“the legislature could not give away nor sell the discretion of its successors”).
27
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1253 (citation omitted); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146
U.S. at 459–60 (explaining that “every succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction
and power as its predecessor” and that “every legislature must, at the time of its existence,
exercise the power of the state in the execution of the trust devolved upon it”).
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climate change have activated an atmospheric trust. Finally, Section D discusses
basic trust principles, the restraints the doctrine imposes on sovereigns, and the legal
implications that flow from applying the public trust doctrine to natural resources.
A. Historical Scope of the Doctrine
In the United States, the public trust doctrine has traditionally protected
“coastlines, harbors, and major rivers and lakes,”28 or, simply put, navigable
waterways. According to Professor Charles Wilkinson, “whether valued in terms of
economics, recreation, beauty, or spirituality,” these resources are “among our most
valuable.”29 In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the seminal public trust
doctrine case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Illinois, like all sovereigns, holds
title to lands beneath its navigable waters “in trust for the people of the state,” so
that “they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them,
and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties.”30 Thus, since its original invocations, the scope of the U.S. public
trust doctrine has been closely associated with navigable waters and the values they
provide as public resources.
Internationally, judicial pronouncement of the public trust doctrine occurred
later than in the United States.31 But the international public trust has been far less
tethered to navigable waterways.32 For example, in M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, the
Supreme Court of India explained that “the public trust doctrine primarily rests on
the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a
great importance to the people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make
them a subject of private ownership.”33 Interestingly, the court cited the “ecological”
reasoning employed in both state and federal cases from the United States to
conclude that there is “no reason why the public trust doctrine should not be
expanded to include all eco-systems operating in our natural resources.”34 Although
courts in the United States have accepted such ecologically-based arguments to
extend the public trust res primarily in the context of waters,35 international courts
have shown a greater willingness to apply this reasoning to other natural resources,
including whole ecosystems.36
28

Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 426.
Id.
30
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.
31
See Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion
Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 746, 748 (2012).
32
See generally id. (exploring the relatively broader scope of the public trust doctrine
in certain jurisdictions outside of the United States).
33
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) 1 SCC 388 (India).
34
Id. (discussing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Ct. Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983) and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988)).
35
See infra Part IV.A.
36
See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) 1 SCC 388 (India).
29
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B. Judicial Interpretation of the Public Trust Doctrine
Courts and scholars have recognized that “in natural resources cases, the trust
property consists of a set of resources important enough to the people to warrant
public trust protection.”37 Nonetheless, perhaps the greatest challenge for courts
reviewing claims brought under the public trust doctrine is determining when—that
is, to which resources—the doctrine applies. According to the Supreme Court of
Hawai‘i, “the public trust, by its very nature, does not remain fixed for all time, but
must conform to changing needs and circumstances.”38 And as Professor Sax, the
father of the modern public trust doctrine, explained, “certainly the principle of the
public trust is broader than its traditional application indicates.”39 As new threats to
natural resources arise and the public responds by invoking their rights to the
continued use and enjoyment of those resources, the public trust doctrine is sure to
evolve.
The judiciary’s role in this evolution is straightforward. As the Arizona Court
of Appeals declared in Butler v. Brewer, “it is up to the judiciary to determine the
scope of the Doctrine.”40 In Butler, which concerned an atmospheric trust claim, the
Arizona court reasoned that when “precedent does not address the measures by
which a resource may be determined to be a part of the public trust or a framework
for analyzing such contentions,” it is appropriate for the court to “assume without
deciding that the atmosphere is a part of the public trust subject to the Doctrine.”41
Consequently, “the fact that the only Arizona cases directly addressing the Doctrine
did so in the context of lands underlying navigable watercourses does not mean that
the Doctrine in Arizona is limited to such lands.”42 Instead, “[a]ny determination of
the scope of the Doctrine depends on the facts presented in a specific case.”43 Thus,

37

Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing MARY C. WOOD, A NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
FOR A NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 167–75 (2014)).
38
Waiāhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000).
39
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 557 (1970). For an assessment of the influence
of Professor Saxs article, see Michael C. Blumm & Zachary A. Schwartz, The Public Trust
Doctrine Fifty Years After Sax and Some Thoughts on its Future, 44 PUBLIC LAND & RES. L.
REV. 1 (2021).
40
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *3
(Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013).
41
Id. at *6.
42
Id.; but see Chernaik v. Brown, 475 P.3d 68, 79–80 (Or. 2020) (declining to expand
the scope of Oregon’s public trust beyond the state’s obligation “to protect the public’s
ability to use navigable waters for identifiable uses” despite acknowledging that, “for over a
century,” the Oregon Supreme Court “has recognized that the public trust doctrine is a
forward-looking doctrine that is flexible enough to accommodate future uses and to protect
against unforeseen harms to the public’s ability to use public trust resources”).
43
Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV 12-0347, 2013 WL 1091209, at *6
(Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013).
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public trust cases require courts to engage in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine
when the doctrine applies.
Not only must courts “determine the threshold question of whether a particular
resource is a part of the public trust subject to the Doctrine, but the courts must also
determine whether based on the facts there has been a breach of the trust.”44 In Kanuk
v. State, which also concerned an atmospheric trust claim, the Supreme Court of
Alaska explained that because Alaskan courts “interpret the public trust doctrine in
a constitutional context,” the judiciary “‘has the constitutionally mandated duty to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Alaska Constitution’” when it reviews
public trust claims.45 The court held that “whether the State has breached [its
fiduciary] legal duty is a question we are well equipped to answer” once “the extent
of the State’s duty” has been judicially determined based on the facts of the case.46
If it were not up to the courts to evaluate when a sovereign has abdicated its public
trust duties, such an inquiry would have no proper forum.
The public trust doctrine thus applies to important natural resources and is
flexible enough to evolve with changing societal needs. To that end, the judiciary’s
role is to determine both when a particular resource falls within the doctrine’s scope
and when the sovereign has violated or failed to meet its public trust duties
concerning public trust resources.
C. The Rise of an Atmospheric Trust
In 2021, some 13,900 scientists from across the globe reaffirmed that Earth is
currently facing a “climate emergency.”47 Emphasizing that climate change is not “a
stand-alone environmental problem,” these scientists called for “transformative
change . . . to protect life on Earth and remain within as many planetary boundaries
as possible.”48 In addition to calls-to-action from scientists, legal scholars have long
urged that “our laws and values cannot continue to ignore the restraints imposed on
human activity by our natural environment” in the face of serious threats to “the
public’s legitimate interest in ecological stability and integrity.”49 Although judges
need not be trained scientists, given the seriousness and complexity of climate
44

Id. at *5.
Kanuk v. State Dep’t Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1099 (Alaska 2014).
46
Id. at 1100.
47
William J. Ripple, Christopher Wolf, Thomas M. Newsome, Jillian W. Gregg,
Timothy M. Lenton, Ignacio Palomo, Jasper A. J. Eikelboom, Beverly E. Law, Saleemul
Huq, Philip B. Duffy, & Johan Rockstrom, World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate
Emergency 2021, 71 BIOSCIENCE 894, 897 (2021); see also Johan Rockstrom et al.,
Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY AND
SOC’Y, no. 2, 2009, at art. 32 (arguing planetary boundaries are the physical and biological
limits within which “humanity can operate safely,” such as a livable climate).
48
Ripple et al., supra note 47, at 897.
49
David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial
Protection of the Public’s Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV.
ENV’TAL. L. REV. 311, 311 (1988).
45
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change, courts need to be cognizant of the inherent relationships that tie together all
components of the natural world.
Several courts worldwide have echoed concerns about the effects of climate
change. For example, the Lahore High Court of Pakistan has recognized that
“[c]limate change is a defining challenge of our time and has led to dramatic
alterations in our planet’s climate system.”50 In Pakistan, “these climatic variations
have primarily resulted in heavy floods and droughts, raising serious concerns
regarding water and food security.”51 Similarly, as one Washington lower court
summarized,
Washington and the Pacific Northwest have experienced long-term
warming, a lengthening of the frost-free season, and more frequent
nighttime heat waves. Sea level is rising on most of Washington’s coast.
Coastal ocean acidity has increased. Glacial area and spring snowpack
have declined, and peak stream flows in many rivers have shifted earlier.
In addition, climate extremes (floods, droughts, fires, and landslides) are
already costly to Washington’s State.52
The rise of atmospheric trust litigation has, in part, been the product of an increased
understanding within the international judiciary of the threats posed by climate
change and the courts’ role in addressing those threats.
D. Basic Trust Principles
“A trust is a type of ownership in which one party manages property for the
benefit of another party.”53 The premise of the trust relationship, therefore, is that
“the trustee is under a fiduciary obligation to manage the assets for the sole benefit
of the beneficiaries.”54 These basic principles apply in private and sovereign
contexts; “in the case of the public trust, the beneficiaries are the citizens.”55 The
implication is that if a public asset—such as the atmosphere—does indeed fall within
the res of a public natural resources trust, the sovereign trustee must manage that
public asset for the sole benefit of the citizen beneficiaries.
As noted in Juliana v. United States, “[t]he natural resources trust operates
according to basic trust principles, which impose upon the trustee a fiduciary duty
50

Leghari v. State, (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *5 (Pak.), http://climatecasechart.
com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/2
0150404_2015-W.P.-No.-25501201_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VFH-QUPB].
51
Id.
52
Foster v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2017 WL 9772318,
at *2 (Wash. Super. Apr. 19, 2017).
53
MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY C. WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 3 (Carolina Acad. Press ed., 3rd ed.
2021).
54
Id.
55
Id.
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to ‘protect the trust property against damage or destruction.’”56 Because “the trustee
owes this duty equally to both current and future beneficiaries of the trust,”57 the
natural resources trust is necessarily intergenerational. Moreover, once “the
existence of a fiduciary duty on the part of the State to protect a public resource” has
been established, “the duty would not seem to depend on the source of the threatened
harm.”58 In other words, the sovereign owes a public trust duty regardless of whether
the sovereign is involved in bringing about harm or a threat of harm to the public
trust res.
Moreover, the public trust doctrine imposes three categories of restrictions on
the sovereign’s authority to administer the natural resources trust.59 First, trust
property “must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must [also] be held
available for use by the general public.”60 Second, trust property may never be sold.61
Third, trust property “must be maintained for particular types of uses.”62 Although
“the ‘traditional’ public trust litigation model . . . centers on the second restriction,
the prohibition against alienation of a public trust asset,” a “wave” of modern public
trust litigation asserts that “state and national governments have abdicated their
responsibilities under the public trust doctrine.”63 Under this modern approach,
“plaintiffs assert that [sovereigns] have violated their duties as trustees by nominally
retaining control over trust assets while actually allowing their depletion and
destruction, effectively violating the first and third restrictions by excluding the
public from use and enjoyment of public resources.”64 In addition to applying the
public trust doctrine to new resources, modern public trust litigation emphasizes the
public rights that sovereigns have a fiduciary obligation to protect.65
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION FRAMEWORK
Many courts have rooted their support for an atmospheric trust in constitutional
language establishing public rights in, or the sovereign’s responsibility for, air,
56

Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert, & William K.
Stevens, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 582 (2016)).
57
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (AM. L. INST. 1959)).
58
Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1095 (denying declaratory relief because such relief would not
“settle” the legal relations at issue and thus would not advance plaintiffs’ interests).
59
Sax, supra note 39, at 477.
60
Id.
61
Id.; see also Waiāhole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 450 (Haw. 2000) (“Although its purpose
has evolved over time, the public trust has never been understood to safeguard rights of
exclusive use for private commercial gain. Such an interpretation, indeed, eviscerates the
trust’s basic purpose of reserving the resource for use and access by the general public
without preference or restriction.”).
62
Sax, supra note 39, at 477.
63
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Id.
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See id.
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climate, a healthy environment, or natural resources generally. Some experts
“observe that cases advancing constitutional theories of climate obligation are
swiftly gaining ground in the world’s domestic courts.”66 Judicial embrace is
strongest when the relevant constitutional provision also speaks to principles of
inter-generational equity. These courts’ recognition of a broad public trust capable
of including the atmosphere illustrates that the doctrine is subject to judicial
expansion.
A. Air and Climate
An atmospheric trust exists where constitutional language establishes public
rights in, and the sovereign’s duty over, air and climate. For example, Article I,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution unequivocally states that “the people
have a right to clean air.”67 That provision declares that “Pennsylvania’s public
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations
yet to come,” and requires the state, “as trustee of these resources,” to “conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”68 The state constitution, therefore,
embodies two of the three categories of restrictions on the sovereign’s authority to
administer the natural resources trust: trust property must be (1) held available for
public use and (2) maintained for public uses.
In Funk v. Wolf, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth court explained that the first
provision “endows the people of Pennsylvania with the right to the described
resources,” thereby “prevent[ing] the state from acting in ways that would infringe
upon such rights.”69 By placing Pennsylvania’s natural resources—including clean
air—in trust for the people,70 the second provision enables citizens to bring a legal
challenge against government actions and inactions infringing on the rights
recognized in the first provision, proceeding upon either or both of two theories: (1)
“‘the government has infringed upon citizens’ rights,’” or (2) “‘has failed in its
trustee obligations.’”71 The court thereby recognized the two categories of
restrictions imposed by the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Similarly, in Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
concluded that the state’s constitution “recognizes that a public trust duty exists for
the protection of New Mexico’s natural resources, including the atmosphere, for the

66

Mary Christina Wood, “On the Eve of Destruction”: Courts Confronting the Climate
Emergency, 97 IND. L.J. 239, 286 (2022) (citing James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Climate
Constitutionalism and Justice in the Courts, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON GLOB. CLIMATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 235 (Jordi Jaria-Manzano & Susana Borràs eds., 2019)).
67
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
68
Id.
69
Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa.
2017) (denying declaratory relief for lack of practical effect).
70
Id. (citing Pa. Env’t. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 167 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015)).
71
Id. (quoting Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 950–51 (Pa. 2013)).
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benefit of the people.”72 Section 21 of Article XX of the New Mexico Constitution
declares that “the protection of the state’s beautiful and healthful environment is
hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to the public interest” and requires
the state to “provide for control of pollution and control of despoilment of the air”
and other natural resources “for the maximum benefit of the people.”73 Thus, the
court held, “the State has a duty to protect the atmosphere” pursuant to its clear
“constitutional mandate.”74 The court recognized the same two categories of
restrictions in the New Mexico Constitution—the sovereign must (1) hold natural
resources in trust for public use and (2) maintain those resources consistent with
public uses.
The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i in In re Application of Gas Co. recently
explained that “a state agency must perform its functions in a manner that fulfills the
State’s affirmative obligations under the Hawai‘i Constitution,” including its
obligations as a trustee of “‘all public natural resources.’”75 The Hawai‘i
Constitution provides that, “‘[f]or the benefit of present and future generations, the
State . . . shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources,
including land, water, air,’” and other resources.76 Thus, the court concluded that
“the state has a continuing duty to monitor the use of trust property, even if the use
of the property has not changed,” and that a state agency’s “constitutional
obligations are ongoing.”77
These cases illustrate that where the relevant constitution speaks to public rights
in, and the sovereign’s duty over, air and climate, courts have embraced the
atmosphere as within the scope of the public trust res. Nevertheless, many other
courts have reached the same conclusion where such explicit constitutional language
about air and climate is lacking.
B. A Healthy Environment
Several courts have rooted their recognition of an atmospheric trust in
constitutional language that establishes public rights in, and the sovereign’s duty
over, a healthy environment. Moreover, according to these courts, the right to a
healthy environment is inherent in other, constitutionally enumerated fundamental
rights. By extension, the sovereign’s maintenance and preservation of a healthy
atmosphere are essential to fulfilling the public’s fundamental rights.
72

Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App.
2015) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the State because plaintiffs failed to allege
a constitutional violation, instead of requesting judicial review and intervention as a matter
of a “common law public trust doctrine”).
73
Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1225 (quoting N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21).
74
Id. at 1226–27.
75
In re Gas Co., LLC, 465 P.3d 633, 654 (Haw. 2020) (vacating and remanding to the
State Public Utilities Commission to “consider its constitutional obligations” in light of the
court’s opinion).
76
Id. (quoting HAW. CONST. art. XI § 1).
77
Id. (citing Ching v. Case, 449 P.3d 1146, 1175–76 (Haw. 2019)).
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In Foster v. State Department of Ecology, a Washington lower court accepted
petitioners’ characterization that where the public’s “rights to a healthy
environment” are constitutionally protected, those rights are actually protected “by
the Public Trust Doctrine embodied therein.”78 In other words, the court accepted
the proposition that a constitutional right to a healthy environment is actually the
recognition of inherent public rights in the environment.79 The court explained that
it allowed petitioners’ case to proceed “due to the emergent need for coordinated
science[-]based action by the State of Washington to address climate change before
efforts to do so are too costly and too late.”80 By recognizing that petitioners were
entitled to an opportunity to “show evidence and argue that their government has
failed and continues to fail to protect them from global warming,”81 the court
embraced its role to determine when the sovereign has failed to meet its public trust
duties.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the Philippines explained, “the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.”82 The right to a healthy environment, therefore,
mandates not only that the state hold trust property—in this context, the environment
as a whole—available for public use, but also that the state maintain the
environment’s health to ensure the continued viability of the public’s use of trust
property. In this way, the right to a healthy environment embodies the first and third
categories of restrictions on the sovereign’s authority to administer the natural
resources trust.83
Similarly, in Sher Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, the National Green
Tribunal of India unequivocally declared that “the citizens of the country have a
fundamental right to a wholesome, clean and decent environment” under India’s
Constitution.84 Citing judgments by the Supreme Court of India from the 1980s
onward,85 the court concluded that “Article 21 of [India’s] Constitution86 has been
expanded to take within its ambit the right to a clean and decent environment” as
part of a broader “right to life and personal liberty.”87 The court explained that the
78

Foster v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2017 WL 9772318,
at *1 (Wash. Super. Apr. 19, 2017) (allowing petitioners to supplement and amend their
petition against the State for its lack of climate change action).
79
See id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at *3.
82
See Oposa v. Factoran, 33 I.L.M. 173, 185 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
83
See Sax, supra note 39, at 477.
84
Sher Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) App. No. 237 (THC)/2013 (CWPIL
No. 15 of 2010), at *5 (India).
85
See Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1985)
1985 A.I.R. 652, 1985 SCR (3) 169 (India); Virender Gaur v. State of Haryana, (1994) 1998
(1) CTC 143 (India).
86
INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.”).
87
Sher Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2014) App. No. 237 (THC)/2013 (CWPIL
No. 15 of 2010), at *5–6 (India).
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“wide dimensions” of Article 21 have consistently been construed by Indian courts
“in the larger public interest.”88 Therefore, the court held that the public interest
demanded that “the most vital necessities, namely air . . . cannot be permitted to be
misused or polluted so as to reduce the quality of life of others.”89 The court also
made clear that when the sovereign enacts environmental statutes and regulations, it
must do so consistent with its role as “the trustee of all natural resources which are
by [their] nature meant for public use and enjoyment” and of which the “[p]ublic at
large is the beneficiary.”90 Thus, the court signaled its willingness to review
legislation for consistency with the public trust doctrine.91
Likewise, the Lahore High Court of Pakistan in Leghari v. State began its
decision by recognizing that “[c]limate change is a defining challenge of our time
and has led to dramatic alterations in our planet’s climate system.”92 Against this
backdrop, the court determined that “[o]n a legal and constitutional plane,” climate
change presents a “clarion call for the protection of fundamental rights of the citizens
of Pakistan.”93 Thus, the court pointed to “fundamental rights” in Pakistan’s
Constitution, emphasizing that such rights “read with constitutional principles of
democracy, equality, [and] social, economic and political justice.”94 The court
focused on Article 9,95 the right to life, “which includes the right to a healthy and
clean environment,” and Article 14,96 the right to human dignity.97
The Leghari court concluded that these fundamental rights also “include within
their ambit and commitment” numerous environmental principles such as “inter and
intra-generational equity and [the] public trust doctrine.”98 In fact, according to the
court, environmental protection has taken “center stage” in Pakistan’s scheme of
constitutional rights.99 The court was thus satisfied that the fundamental rights
articulated in Articles 9 and 14, bolstered by Article 23’s right to property and
Article 19(A)’s right to information, provided “the necessary judicial toolkit to
address and monitor the Government’s response to climate change.”100 Therefore,
88

Id. at *7.
Id. at *9–10.
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M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) 1 SCC 388 (India).
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See id.
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Leghari v. State, (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *5 (Pak.), http://climatecasechart.
com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/2
0150404_2015-W.P.-No.-25501201_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VFH-QUPB].
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Id.
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Id. at *5–6.
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PAK. CONST. art. 9 (“No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance
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PAK. CONST. art. 14 § 1 (“The dignity of man and, subject to law, the privacy of
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Leghari v. State, (2016) W.P. No. 25501/2015, at *5–6 (Pak.), http://climatecasechart
.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/2
0150404_2015-W.P.-No.-25501201_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VFH-QUPB].
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the court held that, concerning climate-change measures, the sovereign could not
continue on its course of “delay and lethargy” and thereby “offend[] the fundamental
rights of the citizens which need to be safeguarded.”101
These cases show that where the relevant constitution speaks to public rights
to, and the sovereign’s duty over, a healthy environment, courts have concluded that
the atmosphere is within the scope of the public trust res. This right to a healthy
environment is inherent in other, constitutionally enumerated fundamental rights.
This trend—which has a robust presence in international jurisprudence outside of
the United States—indicates that courts understand a stable climate system as
necessary to environmental health and well-being.
C. Natural Resources
Some courts have grounded their recognition of an atmospheric trust in
constitutional language that establishes public rights in, and the sovereign’s duty
over, natural resources generally, even absent an explicit reference to air or climate.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted, when “natural resources” appears,
unqualified, in constitutional language, “the term fairly implicates relatively broad
aspects of the environment, and is amenable to change over time to conform, for
example, with the development of related legal and societal concerns.”102 Indeed,
the public trust doctrine is a versatile legal tool for natural resource protection.
In Bonser-Lain v. State Commission on Environmental Quality, a Texas lower
court was unpersuaded by the state commission’s contention that “the public trust
doctrine in Texas is exclusively limited to the conservation of the State’s waters,”
finding this argument “legally invalid.”103 Instead, the court held that “the public
trust doctrine includes all natural resources of the State including the air and
atmosphere.”104 The court reasoned that the doctrine had been incorporated into
section 59 of Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, which provides that the
conservation, development, and preservation “of all of the natural resources of this
State” are “declared public rights and duties,” and which therefore recognizes an
expansive public trust res.105
In Held v. State, a Montana district court held that the state’s practice of
ignoring climate change when approving energy projects may implicate the

101

Id.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950–51.
103
Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 2012 Tex. Dis. LEXIS 80, at *1
(Tex. Dist. Aug. 2, 2012) (holding that the state commission nonetheless had discretion not
to proceed with plaintiffs’ request for rulemaking), vacated, Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality
v. Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2014) (vacating on the ground that plaintiffs
lacked a right to judicial review of an agency’s refusal to adopt rules under Texas State law).
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Id. at *1.
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plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.106 Following Montana Supreme Court precedent, the
court concluded that “a clean and healthful environment is a ‘fundamental right’”
under Article IX of the Montana Constitution,107 and that this right is linked to the
state’s obligation “to prevent unreasonable degradation of natural resources.”108
While not explicitly using “public trust” language, the court recognized that the
inclusion of a state duty over natural resources in the Montana Constitution provides
“‘protections which are both anticipatory and preventative.’”109 Indeed, the Montana
Constitution does not force the state into allowing a “‘degree of environmental
degradation which can be conclusively linked to ill health or physical
endangerment’” before the state’s “‘farsighted environmental protections can be
invoked.’”110 Instead, the state has an affirmative duty to protect natural resources
from substantial impairment.111
These cases demonstrate that where the relevant constitution speaks to public
rights in and the sovereign’s duty over natural resources, courts have interpreted
such language to recognize resources beyond those traditionally associated with the
public trust doctrine—including the atmosphere—as within the scope of the public
trust res. Although language referencing “natural resources” does not bring about
the same clear reference to the atmosphere as language concerning the air or climate,
broad constitutional language may allow for greater judicial flexibility as the public
trust doctrine continues to be applied to new resources and challenges. Moreover,
several courts have recognized that the state has affirmative obligations to protect
trust resources.
D. Inter-Generational Equity
Constitutional language that speaks to inter-generational equity strengthens a
court’s application of the public trust—particularly where that application is to nontraditional public trust resources such as the atmosphere—by establishing a temporal
relationship that mirrors basic trust principles. Because a trustee traditionally owes
106

Held v. State, No. CDV-2020-307, at *14 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2021) (allowing
plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief to proceed while denying a claim for injunctive relief),
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2021/20210804_docket-CDV-2020-307_order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XX6PN8CN].
107
Id. at 13–14 (quoting Mont. Env’t. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’tal Quality, 988 P.2d
1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999); see also MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1) (“The state and each person
shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and
future generations.”).
108
Id. (quoting Mont. Env’t. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1246; see also MONT. CONST. art.
IX, § 1(3)) (“The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to
prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”).
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Id. at 15 (quoting Mont. Env’t. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249).
110
Id. at 14 (quoting Mont. Env’t. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249).
111
See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(3).
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a duty “equally to both current and future beneficiaries of the trust,”112 the sovereign
owes its duties to current and future generations and cannot sanction substantial
impairment of the trust res solely to serve present-day needs.113 Even when courts
have not used “public trust” language, their discussion of the sovereign’s intergenerational duties with respect to natural resources fits within public trust doctrine
jurisprudence.
In Urgenda Foundation v. The State of The Netherlands, the Hague District
Court held that “Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution114 imposes a duty of care on
the State relating to the liveability [sic] of the country and the protection and
improvement of the living environment.”115 The court engaged in a two-part inquiry
to determine whether the sovereign was “taking sufficient mitigation measures” to
meet its duty of care with respect to climate change.116 First, it asked whether there
was an “unlawful hazardous negligence on the part of the State”; second, the court
assessed the government’s actions in light of “the State’s discretionary power.”117
Simply put, the court sought to discern whether the state’s duty of care had been
triggered and, if so, what actions the state needed to take to meet that affirmative
duty.118
The Urgenda Foundation court determined that the “high risk of dangerous
climate change with severe and life-threatening consequences for man and the
environment” triggered the state’s “obligation to protect its citizens from [climate
change] by taking appropriate and effective measures,”119 including mitigation, as
plaintiffs had requested.120 In other words, the imminence and dangerousness of
climate change triggered the state’s duty of care.121 Stressing that “the possibility of
damages for those whose interests Urgenda represents, including current and future
generations of Dutch nationals, is so great and concrete,” the court ruled that “the
State must make an adequate contribution . . . to prevent hazardous climate change”
consistent with its “duty of care.”122 Thus satisfied that the state’s duty of care was
112

Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959)).
113
See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1) (mandating a “healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations”).
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NETH. CONST. art. 21 (“It shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country
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NCC 24 juni 2015, (Urgenda Found./The State of the Netherlands)(Neth.) at 38
(PDF available at http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads
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triggered, the court held that the state was obliged to take effective mitigating and
remedial measures.123
Similarly, in Neubauer v. State, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
held that “the fundamental right to the protection of life and health enshrined in”
Article 2 of Germany’s Constitution124 “imposes on the state a general duty of
protection of life and physical integrity,” and therefore “obliges the state to afford
protection against the risks of climate change.”125 According to the court, this
fundamental right “encompasses the state’s duty to protect and promote the legal
interests of life and physical integrity and to safeguard these interests against
unlawful interference by others.”126 In other words, the court equated the state’s
obligation to protect against climate change with the sovereign’s public trust duty to
safeguard against substantial impairment to the public trust res.127
The Neubauer court emphasized that the state’s duty “does not take effect only
after violations have already occurred,” but is instead an affirmative duty “oriented
towards the future” that can also be invoked “to protect future generations.”128 The
protection required of the state, the court continued, “encompasses protection
against impairments and degradation of constitutionally guaranteed interests caused
by environmental pollution, regardless of who or what circumstances are the
cause.”129 The inter-generational scope of this protection, the court reasoned, was
necessary “[i]n view of the considerable risks” posed by “increasingly severe
climate change.”130 The court’s reasoning recognized the reality that future
generations will be forced to grapple with amplified climate effects.
Although affording protection to both present and future generations, the
Neubauer court distinguished between present and future climate change and the
sovereign’s duties to address each.131 As to present climate change that “is not
preventable or has already taken place,” the court held that the state must “address
the risks by implementing positive measures aimed at alleviating the consequences
of climate change.”132 As to future climate change, on the other hand, the court held
that the state is obligated “to afford protection by taking measures that help to limit
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See id.
GER. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (“Every person shall have the right to life and physical
integrity. Freedom of the person shall be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only
pursuant to a law.”).
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anthropogenic global warming and [] associated climate change.”133 The court’s
reasoning reflected its understanding of the disproportionate climate effects future
generations will face, leading the court to distinguish present-day remedial measures
from limits designed to mitigate additional climate change.134
In Neubauer, the German legislature had set interim goals with gradual steps to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions135 and an overall goal “of achieving climate
neutrality in the foreseeable future.”136 Although the court concluded that the
legislative provisions challenged by plaintiffs had not clearly violated the state’s
duty of protection to the present generation,137 the court nonetheless concluded that
those provisions did violate the state’s duty of protection to future generations.138
The court faulted the legislature for “failing to take sufficient precautionary
measures to manage the obligations to reduce emissions in ways that respect
fundamental rights – obligations that could be substantial in later periods due to the
emissions allowed by law until 2030.”139 Thus, while meeting its obligation to the
present generation, the German legislature’s climate goals were insufficient to meet
the sovereign’s obligation to future generations.140
These cases illustrate that, where the relevant constitution speaks to intergenerational equity in connection with the sovereign’s duties to the public, courts
have used this language to aid their embrace of an atmospheric trust. Given the longterm, far-reaching threats posed by climate change and the degradation of an
inherently “public” resource—the air we breathe—these courts also appear to
impose a high burden of proof on the sovereign to show that it is complying with its
public trust duties to present and future generations.
III. THE INTER-RESOURCE AFFECTATION FRAMEWORK
Although courts have not always concluded that the atmosphere itself is a
public trust resource, several have concluded that threats to non-traditional public
trust resources are intricately connected to traditional public trust resources. In those
courts’ view, this relationship—which this paper terms “inter-resource
affectation”—brings plaintiffs’ claims within the scope of the public trust doctrine.
In this way, courts can recognize an atmospheric trust without explicitly defining
the scope of the public trust res. Several cases reflect this framework; these cases
133
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primarily arise in the United States, where a federalist system of dual sovereigns—
the federal government and the states—has produced different definitions of the
public trust in different jurisdictions.
A. Establishing the Framework
The principle of inter-resource affectation is perhaps best illustrated by courts’
recognition of groundwater as within the scope of the res subject to the public trust
doctrine even though groundwater is not a traditional public trust resource. For
example, in In re Water Use Permit Applications for Waiāhole Ditch, the Supreme
Court of Hawai‘i concluded that there was “little sense in adhering to artificial
distinctions” between groundwater and surface waters—a distinction not “borne out
in the present practical realities of this state.”141 The court reasoned that “[i]n other
states, the ‘purposes’ or ‘uses’ of the public trust have evolved with changing public
values and needs,” including recognition of a “distinct public interest in resource
protection.”142 Moreover, the court recognized that “[m]odern science and
technology have discredited the surface-ground dichotomy” and instead
acknowledge “‘the unity of the hydrological cycle.’”143 Therefore, the court deferred
to a state commission’s invocation of the precautionary principle144 to protect
instream water uses, agreeing that “public trust purposes” (public use of the public
trust res) should prevail over diversionary interests.145 In reaching its decision, the
court was persuaded by the underlying scientific consensus that certain natural
resources—here, ground and surface waters—form two parts of a larger,
interconnected system.
Similarly, in Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control
Board, the California Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s holding that the public
trust doctrine applies to groundwater if extraction “adversely impacts a navigable
waterway.”146 In other words, where “the removal of water will have an adverse
impact on navigable water clearly within the public trust,” the court was satisfied
that it could evaluate groundwater pumping for compliance with the public trust
doctrine.147 Given judicial embrace of an inter-resource affectation framework in the
groundwater context, courts have paved the way for this framework to apply to other
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non-traditional public trust resources where their degradation impairs navigable
waterways clearly within the traditional public trust res.
B. Application to the Atmosphere
The decision in Juliana v. United States offers a persuasive application of the
inter-resource affectation framework in the atmospheric trust context.148 In Juliana,
twenty-one youth plaintiffs argued that numerous government entities149 “violated
their obligation to hold certain natural resources in trust for the people and for future
generations” by deliberately allowing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations to
reach unprecedented levels.150 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the government
defendants “violated their duties as trustees by failing to protect the atmosphere,
water, seas, seashores, and wildlife.”151 The defendants countered that “plaintiffs’
public trust claims fail because the complaint focuses on harm to the atmosphere,
which is not a public trust asset.”152 The federal District of Oregon, however, decided
it was unnecessary “to determine whether the atmosphere is a public trust asset”
given that plaintiffs had “alleged violations of the public trust doctrine in connection
with the territorial sea.”153
The Juliana court concluded that “[b]ecause a number of plaintiffs’ injuries
relate to the effects of ocean acidification and rising ocean temperatures,” plaintiffs
had “adequately alleged harm to public trust assets.”154 The court was satisfied that
harm to the atmosphere, when it impairs long-recognized public trust resources,
implicates the public trust doctrine, effectively applying the inter-resource
affectation framework.155 This reasoning is consistent with prior judicial practice of
148

Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1254 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d
1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding for lack of redressability as required for
plaintiffs to satisfy Article III standing).
149
These entities included then-President of the United States Barack Obama, the
Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior,
the Department of Transportation, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. Id. at 1233–34.
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Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233.
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Id. at 1255.
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Id.
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Id. at 1256. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ case on appeal for lack of
standing (based on redressability grounds) without disturbing the public trust interpretations
of the district court. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1169–75 (9th Cir. 2020).
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See also Foster v. Washington Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL
7721362, at *4 (Wash. Super. Nov. 19, 2015) (explaining that “current science makes clear
that global warming is impacting the acidification of the oceans to alarming and dangerous
levels, thus endangering the bounty of our navigable waters”), abrogated by Aji P. by &
through Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021), review denied sub nom. Aji P.
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looking past artificial distinctions between natural resources to expand the
application of the public trust doctrine beyond those resources traditionally within
the public trust res.156
C. Interaction with Constitutional Recognition
The two frameworks discussed above overlap. Under the constitutional
recognition framework, sovereigns recognize—and courts adhere to—the ecological
importance of protecting air, climate, a healthy environment, and natural resources.
Under the inter-resource affectation framework, courts also recognize the inherent
ecological interconnections between navigable waters and other resources.
Application of the inter-resource affectation framework is strongest when coupled
with a constitutional grounding.
For example, the Juliana court implicated the atmosphere in the public trust
doctrine’s scope as a matter of inter-resource affectation.157 But in Juliana, the court
also considered plaintiffs’ claims on constitutional grounds rooted in the U.S.
Constitution’s Due Process Clause.158 Because the court determined that public trust
rights were implicit in due process,159 this constitutional grounding provided the
court with a catalyst to vindicate plaintiffs’ public trust rights. Although the
sovereign’s public trust duties exist independent of any constitutional recognition,
where plaintiffs (and courts) point to a constitutional provision that contemplates the
public’s right to enforce those duties, such constitutional grounding can act as a
vehicle for judicial recognition of public trust rights.
In Juliana, the youth plaintiffs argued, in addition to their public trust claims,
that numerous government entities were violating plaintiffs’ “substantive due
process rights to life, liberty, and property” by deliberately allowing atmospheric
carbon dioxide concentrations to reach unprecedented levels.160 The court agreed,
holding that plaintiffs had “adequately alleged infringement of a fundamental
right.”161 According to the court:
v. State, 497 P.3d 350 (Wash. 2021); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court],
Civil Cassation abril 4, 2018, Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona, 11001-22-03-000-201800319-01, p. 34 (Colom.) (explaining that deforestation in the Amazon leads to rampant
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, producing the greenhouse gas effect,
which in turn transforms and fragments ecosystems, altering water sources and the water
supply for population centers) (translated excerpts by Dejusticia), http://climatecasechart.
com/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2018/20180405_11001-22-03000-2018-00319-00_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AE2-LW7M].
156
See supra Part III.A.
157
See supra Part III.A–B.
158
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250–51 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
159
Id. at 1261 (“[P]laintiffs’ public trust claims are properly categorized as substantive
due process claims.”).
160
Id. at 1233.
161
Id. at 1250.
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[W]here a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and
substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause human
deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property,
threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s
ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process violation.162
As the court saw it, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords
no protection against a government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens
breathe or the water its citizens drink.”163 In other words, these fundamental rights
need not be explicitly stated in a constitution to benefit from constitutional
protection.
The Juliana court held that “plaintiffs’ public trust rights both predated the
[U.S.] Constitution and are secured by it,” although “plaintiffs’ right of action to
enforce the government’s obligations as trustee arises from the Constitution.”164 The
court explained that “the Due Process Clause’s substantive component safeguards
fundamental rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ or ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”165 According to the court,
“[p]laintiffs’ public trust rights, related as they are to inherent aspects of sovereignty
and the consent of the governed from which the United States’ authority derives,
satisfy both tests.”166 In other words, the Due Process Clause—and its protection of
fundamental rights—acted as a vehicle for the court to consider plaintiffs’
fundamental public trust rights.167
The Juliana court’s discussion of substantive due process indicates that where
the relevant constitution does not contain express language establishing public rights
in or the sovereign’s responsibility for air, climate, a healthy environment, or natural
resources, the strength of a plaintiff’s atmospheric trust claim can rest upon the ties
the plaintiff establishes between climate change and traditional public trust
resources—that is, upon inter-resource affectation. For example, in Aji P. v. State,
youth plaintiffs contended that they had “alleged valid public trust doctrine claims”
in their complaint against the state of Washington for its reliance on fossil fuels
because “‘navigable waters and the atmosphere are intertwined.’”168 In the plaintiffs’
view, “‘to argue a separation of the two, or to argue that [greenhouse gas] emissions
do not affect navigable waters,’” would be “‘nonsensical’” on the state’s part.169
However, looking to the Washington State Constitution, which enumerates the
162
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Id.
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Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1260–61.
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Id. at 1261 (citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761, 767 (2010)).
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This is not to suggest that the court could not have considered the plaintiffs’ public
trust claim independent of a constitutional claim.
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Aji P. by & through Piper v. State, 480 P.3d 438, 457–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021),
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traditional definition of state ownership over the beds and shores of navigable
waters, the court disagreed.170
The court concluded that the “complaint alleges a violation of the public trust
doctrine in relation to the climate system as a whole, including the atmosphere,”
whereas “Washington has not yet expanded the public trust doctrine to encompass
the atmosphere.”171 Although plaintiffs maintained that they “‘alleged impairment
to traditional Public Trust Resources such as navigable waters and submerged
lands,’” the court was unpersuaded.172 In fact, the court deemed this a
“recharacterization” of plaintiffs’ allegations, paying particular attention to
plaintiffs’ assertion in their complaint that “‘[t]he overarching public trust resource
is the climate system, which encompasses the atmosphere, waters, oceans, and
biosphere.’”173 In short, by framing the “‘effect on the public’s ability to use, access,
enjoy and navigate the state’s tidelands, shorelands, and navigable waters’” as a
consequence of climate change,174 plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the court’s
limited reading of the public trust doctrine in the context of narrow constitutional
language.
Nonetheless, Aji P. does not foreclose atmospheric trust claims more explicitly
rooted in the impairment of traditional public trust resources. Referring to climate
change impacts “on already-recognized public trust resources such as water,
shorelines, wildlife, and fish,” the Supreme Court of Alaska has recognized that
“[a]llegations that the State has breached its duties with regard to the management
of these resources do not depend on a declaratory judgment about the
atmosphere.”175 Therefore, a court need not decide that the atmosphere is a public
trust resource to consider the effects of climate change on traditional public trust
resources under the inter-resource affectation framework.
Had the Aji P. plaintiffs claimed that greenhouse gases, particularly dissolved
carbon dioxide, create higher river and stream temperatures that impair the public’s
ability to fish and recreate in those waters, the court would have been more likely to
see this injury as directly tied to plaintiffs’ use of traditional public trust resources.
Likewise, the navigability of traditionally navigable waters has been and continues
to be threatened by climate change.176 Because climate change stresses water
availability and thereby alters the structure of rivers and streams,177 a claim of
impairment to navigability could bolster an atmospheric trust claim where a plaintiff
cannot assist her position with helpful constitutional language. In other words,
alleging impairment to navigable waterways as a result of climate change, rather
than alleging impairment to the climate that in turn affects navigable waterways,
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Id. at 457.
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Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1103.
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frames the issue in terms more closely aligned with a limited reading of a narrow
state doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Emerging best practices for applying the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere
in the context of climate change litigation exist as two analytical frameworks: (1)
constitutional recognition and (2) inter-resource affectation. Under the first
framework, constitutional recognition, sovereigns recognize—and courts enforce—
the ecological importance of protecting air, climate, a healthy environment, and
natural resources based on constitutional language establishing public rights to, and
the sovereign’s duty over, such resources. Under the second framework, interresource affectation, courts recognize the inherent ecological ties between navigable
waters and other resources and thus implicate the atmosphere within the public trust
doctrine’s scope, even if the court does not define the atmosphere as part of the
public trust res. Judicial invocation of either of the above frameworks gives rise to
an atmospheric trust that the sovereign must manage in the public interest consistent
with trust principles. Once courts recognize the atmosphere as within the scope of
the public trust res, the sovereign can no longer shirk its fiduciary duty to “protect
the trust property against damage or destruction”178 by allowing climate change to
progress unabated.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959).

